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                IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
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                         MARSHALL DIVISION
   PPS DATA, LLC
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                                      CIVIL ACTION NO.
                                 ) (
 6
   VS.
                                 ) ( 2:18-CV-07-JRG
 7
                                 ) ( MARSHALL, TEXAS
 8
                                 ) ( SEPTEMBER 12, 2019
   JACK HENRY & ASSOCIATES, INC.) (8:27 A.M.
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                      TRANSCRIPT OF JURY TRIAL
11
         BEFORE THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUDGE RODNEY GILSTRAP
12
                    UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
   APPEARANCES:
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14
   FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
   MR. ANTHONY SON
15
   MR. STEVE MADDOX
16
   MR. KAVEH SABA
   MR. MATT RUEDY
17
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18
   Washington, DC 20006
19
   COURT REPORTER:
                      Shelly Holmes, CSR, TCRR
20
                       Official Court Reporter
                       United States District Court
                       Eastern District of Texas
21
                      Marshall Division
                       100 E. Houston
22
                      Marshall, Texas 75670
23
                       (903) 923-7464
24
    (Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography, transcript
   produced on a CAT system.)
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  FOR THE DEFENDANT:
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 3
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PROCEEDINGS
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            (Jury out.)
 3
            COURT SECURITY OFFICER: All rise.
 4
            THE COURT: Be seated, please.
            Are the parties prepared to read into the record
5
   those items from the list of pre-admitted exhibits used
6
7
   during yesterday's portion of the trial?
8
            MR. SON: PPS Data does not have any exhibits to
   read into the record.
10
            THE COURT: You didn't use any items from the list
   of pre-admitted exhibits during yesterday's portion of the
11
12
   trial, Mr. Son?
            MR. SON: No.
13
14
            THE COURT: How about Defendant?
            MR. MAZINGO: We do, Your Honor. Mr. Alexander
15
16
   will read those in.
17
            THE COURT: Let's proceed.
18
            MR. ALEXANDER: Yesterday, Defendant submitted the
19
   following defense trial exhibits: 2, 7, 15, 65, 89, 111,
   132, 258.
20
21
            THE COURT: All right. Do Plaintiffs have any
22
   objection to that rendition by the Defendant?
23
            MR. SON: No -- no objection.
24
            THE COURT: All right. Thank you, counsel.
25
            Before I bring the jury in and begin my final
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instructions to the jury, I want to remind those present, particularly our friends in the gallery, that in the Court's view, the Court's final instructions to the jury and counsel's closing arguments are the most serious part of a very serious process.

Therefore, I especially do not want any distractions during my final instructions or counsel's closing arguments that might divert the jury's attention from what's going on.

Consequently, if you need to do something in the gallery, if you need to get something, if you need to take something out, if you need to come or go, if you need to shift or rattle papers, do it now. Don't do it once I bring the jury in and we start the final instructions and closing arguments.

I want everybody completely still and completely attentive without any disruptions whatsoever.

And it goes without saying that once we have a verdict and I read that verdict into the record, there are to be no reactions from anyone in the courtroom. I know you understand that, but I just want to emphasize it one last time.

Are there any questions or issues that need to be raised by either party before I bring the jury in and proceed with the Court's final instructions or charge to

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the jury that have not been previously taken up?
1
2
            Does Plaintiff have anything else?
            MR. SON: No, Your Honor.
 3
            THE COURT: Do Defendants?
 4
            MR. HEIDRICK: Your Honor, our paralegal is out in
 5
   the hallway. Would you like for me to go get him now
6
7
   before --
            THE COURT: I don't want he or she coming and
8
           He's been pretty active through this trial coming
   going.
   and going, and I don't want that during closing.
10
11
            MR. HEIDRICK: If I may go get him.
12
            THE COURT: Let's do that now.
13
            MR. HEIDRICK: Thank you, Your Honor.
            THE COURT: Mr. Maddox, the Plaintiff has 28
14
15
   minutes total for closing arguments. Would you like a
16
   warning on your first closing argument when a certain
   amount of time has been used?
17
18
            MR. MADDOX: Yes, please, Your Honor.
19
                        What would you like me to warn you?
            THE COURT:
20
            MR. MADDOX: May I have a warning at 17 minutes?
21
            THE COURT: When you have used 17 minutes.
22
            MR. MADDOX: Yes, sir, when I have used 17
23
   minutes.
24
            THE COURT: I will do that.
25
            MR. MADDOX:
                         Thank you.
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THE COURT: And, Mr. Heidrick, what kind of 1 2 warning, if any, would you like for Defendant's closing argument? 3 MR. HEIDRICK: I would like five minutes, Your 4 5 Honor, please. THE COURT: Five minutes before the time ends? 6 7 MR. HEIDRICK: Five minutes, yes, please, sir. THE COURT: Okay. All right. Unless there's 8 something further, let's bring in the jury, Mr. Elliott. 9 10 COURT SECURITY OFFICER: All rise. 11 (Jury in.) 12 THE COURT: Good morning, members of the jury. 13 Welcome back, and please be seated. Members of the jury, you've now heard all the 14 15 evidence in this case, and I'm now going to instruct you on 16 the law that you must apply. 17 I want you to understand each of you are going to 18 have your own printed copy of these final jury 19 instructions. That being the case, you're welcome to take 20 notes as I give you these instructions, but there's no real 21 need to because you'll have your own printed copy to review 22 when you retire to deliberate. 23 It's your duty to follow the law as I give it to 24 you. On the other hand, and as I've previously said, you, 25 the jury, are the sole judges of the facts in this case.

Do not consider any statement that I have made over the course of the trial or might make during these instructions as an indication to you that I have any opinion about the facts in this case.

You're about to hear closing arguments from the attorneys for the parties. Statements and arguments of the attorneys, let me remind you, are not evidence, and they are not, ladies, instructions on the law. They're intended only to assist you in understanding the evidence and the parties' competing contentions.

A verdict form has been prepared for you, and you will take this verdict form with you to the jury room while you deliberate. And when you have reached a unanimous decision as to the verdict, you will have your foreperson fill in the blanks in the form reflecting your unanimous answers to those questions, then your foreperson will date it and sign it on the final page. You'll then advise the Court Security Officer that you have reached a verdict.

Each answer in the verdict form should be answered by you from the facts as you find them to be. Do not decide who you think should win this case and then answer the questions to reach that result. Again, your answers and your verdict must be unanimous.

Now, in determining whether any fact has been proven in this case, you may, unless otherwise instructed,

consider the testimony of all the witnesses regardless of who may have called them, and you may consider the effect of all the exhibits received and admitted into evidence, regardless of who may have introduced or presented them.

You, the jurors, are the sole judges of the credibility and believability of each and every witness, and you're the sole judges of the amount of weight and effect to be given to each portion of the evidence in this case.

As I've previously told you, the attorneys in this case are acting as advocates for their competing parties and as to their competing claims, and they have a duty to raise objections when they believe evidence is offered throughout the course of the trial that should not be admitted under the rules of the Court.

In those cases where I have sustained an objection to a question that was addressed to a witness, you must disregard the question entirely, and you may draw no inferences from its wording or speculate about what the witness would have said if I had allowed them to answer the question.

On the other hand, if an objection was overruled, then you're to treat the answer and the question just as if no objection had been made, that is, like any other question and answer.

Now, at certain times throughout the course of the trial, it's been necessary for the Court to talk with the lawyers here at the bench outside of your hearing or by asking you to retire to the jury room and talking with them when you were outside of the courtroom. This happens during trials because there are things that occasionally come up that do not involve the jury.

You should not speculate about what was said during any of those discussions that took place outside of your presence.

Now, members of the jury, there are two types of evidence that you may consider in properly finding the truth as to the facts in this case.

One is direct evidence, such as the testimony of an eyewitness.

The other is indirect or circumstantial evidence, that is, the proof of a chain of circumstances that indicates the existence or the nonexistence of certain other facts.

As a general rule, you should know that the law makes no distinction between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence, but the law simply requires that you, the jury, find the facts based on the evidence presented, both direct and circumstantial.

Now, certain testimony in this case has been

presented to you through depositions. A deposition is the sworn, recorded answers to questions asked to a witness in advance of the trial.

If a witness can't be present in person to testify, then the witness's testimony may be presented under oath in the form of a deposition.

As I've told you earlier before the trial began, the attorneys representing both sides in this case questioned these deposition witnesses under oath. At that time, a court reporter was present, the witness was sworn and placed under oath, they were asked questions, and their answers, together with those questions, were transcribed and recorded.

You've seen the deposition testimony presented by way of a video recording, and you've seen deposition testimony presented through live readings by the attorney and an individual playing the role of the witness.

Both of these forms of dep -- deposition testimony are entitled to the same consideration by you, the jury, as testimony given by a live witness appearing in person and testifying during the trial from the witness stand in open court.

Accordingly, you should judge the credibility and importance of deposition testimony to the best of your ability just as if the witness had appeared in person and

testified in open court.

Now, while you should consider only the evidence in this case, you should understand, members of the jury, that you are permitted to draw such reasonable inferences from the testimony and exhibits that you feel are justified in the light of common experience.

Said another way, you may make deductions and reach conclusions that reason and common sense lead you to draw from the facts that have been established through the testimony and the evidence in this case.

However, you should not base your decisions on any evidence not presented by the parties in open court during this trial, including your own personal experiences with checks or banking.

Now, unless I instruct you otherwise, you may properly determine that the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to prove any fact, even if a greater number of witnesses may have testified to the contrary if after considering all of the other evidence, you believe that single witness.

When knowledge of a technical subject may be helpful to the jury, a person who has special training and experience in that technical field, called an expert witness, is permitted to state his or her opinions on those technical matters to the jury.

However, you're not required to accept those opinions. As with any other witness, it is solely up to you to decide who you believe and who you don't believe and whether or not you want to rely on their testimony.

Now, certain exhibits have been shown to you over the course of the trial that were simply illustrations. We call these types of exhibits demonstrative exhibits or sometimes just demonstratives for short.

Demonstrative exhibits are a party's depiction, picture, or model to describe something involved in the trial. If your recollection of the evidence differs from the demonstratives, you should rely on your recollection.

Remember, demonstratives, which are sometimes called jury aids, are not evidence, but the witness's testimony during which a demonstrative is used by the witness is evidence.

Now, in any legal action, facts must be proven by a required amount of proof or evidence known as the burden of proof.

The burden of proof in this case is on the Plaintiff for some issues, and it's on the Defendant for other issues. There are two different burdens of proof that you will apply in this case. One is the preponderance of the evidence, the other is clear and convincing evidence.

The Plaintiff in this case, PPS Data, LLC, who you've heard referred to throughout the trial both as the Plaintiff and simply as PPS Data, has the burden of proving patent infringement by a preponderance of the evidence.

PPS Data also has the burden of proving damages for any patent infringement by a preponderance of the evidence.

A preponderance of the evidence means evidence that persuades you that the claim is more probably true than not true. Sometimes this is talked about as being the greater weight and degree of credible testimony.

Now, the Defendant in this case, Jack Henry & Associates, Inc., who you've heard referred to throughout the trial as either the Defendant or Jack Henry, has the burden of proving patent invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.

Clear and convincing evidence means evidence that produces in your mind an abiding conviction that the truth of the party's factual contentions are highly probable.

Now, although proof to an absolute certainty is not required, the clear and convincing evidence standard requires a greater degree of persuasion than is necessary for the preponderance of the evidence standard.

If the proof, members of the jury, establishes in your mind an abiding conviction in the truth of the matter, then the clear and convincing evidence standard has been

met.

Now, these standards are different from what you've heard about or learned during criminal proceedings where a fact has to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

On a scale of the various standards of proof, as you move from preponderance of the evidence on one end, where proof need only be sufficient to tip the scales in the favor of the party proving that fact, to the other end of the spectrum of beyond a reasonable doubt, where a fact must be proven to a very high degree of certainty, you can think of clear and convincing evidence as being between those two ends of the spectrum.

Now, in determining whether any fact has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing evidence, you may, unless otherwise instructed, consider the stipulations, the testimony of all the witness -- witnesses, regardless of who called them, and all the exhibits received into evidence during the trial, regardless of who may have produced them.

Now, as I did at the start of the case, I'm going to first give you a summary of each side's contentions in this case, and I'll then provide you with detailed instructions on what each side must prove to win on each of its contentions.

As I've previously told you, this case concerns

one United States patent, U.S. Patent No. 7,216,106, which you've heard referred to throughout the trial as the '106 patent. You've also heard it called the patent-in-suit or perhaps the asserted patent.

Patent Claims 1 through 6 and 9 of the '106 patent are what is at issue in this case. You've heard them referred to throughout the trial as the asserted claims.

Plaintiff claims that Claims 1 through 6 and Claim 9 of the '106 patent were infringed by the Defendant, and the Plaintiff is seeking money damages because of that infringement.

The Defendant denies that it has infringed any of the asserted claims, Claims 1 through 6 and Claims 9 -- Claim 9 of the '106 patent. And the Defendant contends that these claims are invalid.

It's your job, members of the jury, to decide whether the Plaintiff has proven that the Defendant has infringed any of the asserted claims and whether the Defendant has proven that any of the asserted claims are invalid.

Infringement and -- and invalidity are separate questions and should be considered and answered separately.

If you decide that the asserted claims have been infringed and are not invalid, then you'll need to decide what amount of money damages, if any, to award to the

Plaintiff to compensate it for that infringement.

Now, as I did at the beginning of the trial, I gave you some general information about patents and the patent system at the beginning of the trial that was relevant to this case. I'm now going to give you more detailed instructions about how the patent laws of our country relate to this case.

Before you can decide many of the issues in this case, you will need to understand the role of the patent claims.

The patent claims are the numbered sentences at the end of the patent. The claims are important because it's the words of the claims that define what a patent covers.

The figures, the drawings, and the text and the rest of the patent provide a description or examples of the invention, and they provide a context for the claims. But it is the claims that define the breadth of the patent's coverage.

Each claim is effectively treated as if it were a separate patent, and each claim may cover more or may cover less than any other claim.

Accordingly, what a patent covers depends, as a result, on what each of its claims cover.

Claims may describe methods or products, such as

machines or processes for making or for using a product.

In this case, the asserted claims are -- are computer-readable medium claims. The claims at issue here describe a computer-readable medium for a method for remote deposit of checks.

Now, patent claims may exist in two forms referred to as independent claims and dependent claims. This case involves one independent claim, Claim 1 of the '106 patent, and six dependent claims, Claims 2 through 6 and Claim 9 of the '106 patent.

An independent claim does not refer to any other claim of the patent. An independent claim sets forth all the requirements that must be met in order to be covered by that claim.

As a result, it's not necessary to look at any other claim to determine what an independent claim covers.

Again, Claim 1 in this case is the only independent claim.

A dependent claim, on the other hand, does not by itself recite all the requirements of the claim but refers to another claim for some of its requirements.

In this way, the claim depends from another claim.

A dependent claim incorporates all of the requirements of the claim to which it refers or from which it depends. The dependent claim then adds its own additional requirements.

So to determine what a dependent claim covers,

it's necessary to look at both the dependent claim itself and any other claim from which it refers, or as we sometimes say, from which it depends.

All the claims at issue in this case, except

Claim 1, are dependent claims. Each patent claim sets

forth in words a set of requirements in a single sentence.

The requirements of a claim are usually divided into parts or steps called limitations. Sometimes they're called elements.

If a device, system, apparatus, or instrumentality satisfies each of these requirements in the claim's sentence, then it is said that the device, system, apparatus, or instrumentality is covered by the claim, falls under the claim, or infringes the claim.

For example, a claim that covers the invention of a table may recite a tabletop, four legs, and glue that secures the legs to the tabletop. In this example, the tabletop, the legs, and the glue are each separate limitations or elements of the claim.

Now, the beginning portion or preamble of a claim often uses the word "comprising." The word "comprising," as used in the preamble, means including or containing. When comprising is used in the preamble, a product that includes all the limitations or elements of the claim, as well as additional elements, is covered by the claim.

For example, a claim to a table comprising -comprising a tabletop, legs, and glue would be infringed by
a table that includes a tabletop, legs, and glue even if
the table also includes wheels on the ends of the table's
legs -- that is, other things.

If a product is missing even one element or limitation of a claim, it does not meet all the requirements of the claim and is not covered by the claim. And if a product is not covered by the claim, it does not infringe that claim.

Now, you first need to understand each claim term in order to decide whether or not there is infringement of a claim and to decide whether or not the claim is invalid.

The law says that it's my role to define the terms or the language of the claims, and it's your role to apply my definitions to the issues that you've been asked to decide in this case.

Therefore, as I explained to you at the start of the case, I have already determined the meanings of certain claim language, and I've provided a chart showing you those constructions or definitions in your juror notebooks.

My definitions of certain claim terms, as well as certain definitions that have been agreed to by the parties, are set forth in that chart in your juror notebooks. You must accept these definitions of these

words from the claims as being correct.

It's your job to take these definitions and apply them to all the issues that you're deciding, including the issues of infringement and invalidity.

During your deliberations, you must apply the meanings of those defined claim terms as I have supplied them to you and as set forth in your juror notebooks.

Now, for any of the words in the claims for which I have not provided you with a definition, you should apply their plain and ordinary meaning -- meaning, as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, which is to say, in the field of the technology of the patent at the time of the alleged invention of the '106 patent.

The meaning of the words of the patent claims must be the same when deciding issues of infringement and when deciding issues of invalidity.

My interpretation of the language from the claims should not be taken by you as an indication that I have a view regarding the issues of infringement or invalidity. The decisions regarding infringement and invalidity are yours to make.

I'll now instruct you on specific rules that you must follow to determine whether a Plaintiff has proven that Defendant has infringed Claims 1 through 6 and Claim 9 of the '106 patent.

To prove infringement, the Plaintiff, PPS Data, must persuade you that it is more likely than not that Defendant, Jack Henry & Associates, has infringed these asserted claims. You must decide whether Defendant has made, used, sold, or offered to sell within the United States a product or a service covered by the asserted claims.

You must compare the asserted claims to the accused products and services to determine whether every requirement of the claim is included in the accused products.

To prove infringement, Plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant made, used, sold, or offered to sell within the United States an accused product that includes each and every element or limitation of the asserted claims.

In determining whether an accused product infringes the asserted claims, you must compare the accused product with each requirement as recited in the claims.

The proper comparison is between the language of the claims and the accused products.

A claim requirement is present if it exists in the accused product, as I've explained the language of the requirement to you, or if I did not explain it to you, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art.

If the accused product omits even one single requirement of a claim, then you must find that the accused product does not infringe the claim.

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The Plaintiff in this case has asserted multiple claims against the Defendant. For purposes of determining infringement, each claim is to be effectively treated as if it were a separate patent, with infringement determined separately on a claim-by-claim basis.

As a result, what a patent covers is -- or rather, what a patent covers in total is ultimately dependent upon what each of its claims cover.

Additionally, for purposes of determining infringement, the only correct comparison that you should make is between the language of the asserted claims and the accused products of the Defendant. That is important.

In determining infringement, you are not required to find that the Defendant intended to infringe the claims of the patent-in-suit. A Defendant may infringe a patent without any intent to infringe the patent or without any knowledge that the patent, in fact, exists.

Additionally, to infringe a claim, which merely recites the capability to perform a claimed function, an accused device need only be capable of operating in the described manner.

In fact, depending on the claims, an accused

device may be found to infringe if it is reasonably capable of satisfying the claim limitations, even though it may also be capable of non-infringing modes of operation.

In the context of this case, the term "capable of" means that the accused products must have program code present that satisfies the claim limitations.

Now, the question of invalidity of a patent claim is determined from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art in the field of the claimed invention as of the time of the invention.

In deciding the level of ordinary skill in the field of the invention, you should consider all the evidence introduced in -- at trial -- at trial, including, but not limited to, the levels of education and experience of the inventors and other persons actively working in the field, the types of problems encountered in the field, prior art solutions to those problems, rapidity with which innovations are made, and the sophistication of the technology.

You, members of the jury, are to decide the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.

Now, the Defendant also contends that the '106 patent is invalid because it claims subject matter that is not eligible for patent protection.

A patent claim is not eligible for protection if

the patented claims involve no more than the performance of activities which a person of ordinary skill in the art would have considered well-understood, routine, and conventional at the time the patent application was filed.

The patent application for the '106 patent was filed on April the 28th, 2000.

In determining whether a patent claim involves the performance of well-understood, routine, and conventional activities, you may consider statements made in the patent's specification, as well as evidence of the prior art.

In patent law, a system, device, method, publication, or patent that pre-dated the patent claim at issue is called prior art.

Prior art may include items that were publicly known or that have been used or offered for sale or references, such as publications or other patents, that disclose the claimed invention or elements of the claimed invention.

To be prior art, the item or reference must have been made, known, used, published, patented, or filed as a patent application before the application date of the '106 patent.

To succeed on its claim for invalidity, the Defendant must show by clear and convincing evidence that

the elements of the asserted claims, when taken
individually or when taken as an ordered combination,
involve only activities which a person of ordinary skill in
the art would have considered to be well-understood,
routine, and conventional as of April the 28th, 2000, which
is the application date for the '106 patent.

Whether a particular technology was well-understood, routine, and conventional goes beyond what simply was known in the prior art. The mere fact that something is disclosed in a piece of prior art does not mean that it was well-understood, routine, and conventional.

At the same time, the specification of the '106 patent may be such evidence, if you find that the specification shows that the elements of the asserted claims were well-understood, routine, and conventional.

If you award damages in this case, they must be adequate to compensate the Plaintiff for any infringement of the asserted claims that you may find. You must not award the Plaintiff more damages than are adequate to compensate for the infringement, nor should you include any additional amount for purposes of punishing the Defendant.

Damages are not meant to punish an infringer.

Your damages award, if you reach that issue in this case,
should put the Plaintiff in approximately the same

financial position that it would have been in had the infringement not occurred.

Plaintiff has the burden to establish the amount of its damages by a preponderance of the evidence. In other words, members of the jury, you should award only those damages that the Plaintiff establishes that it, more likely than not, suffered as a result of the Defendant's infringement of the claims of the '106 patent, the asserted claims of the '106 patent.

While the Plaintiff is not required to prove the amount of its damages with mathematical precision, it must prove them with reasonable certainty. Plaintiff is not entitled to damages that are remote or speculative.

The patent laws specifically provide the damages for infringement may not be less than a reasonable royalty.

A reasonable royalty is the amount of royalty payment that a patentholder and the alleged infringer would have agreed to in a hypothetical negotiation taking place at a time immediately prior to when the infringement first began.

In considering this hypothetical negotiation, you should focus on what the expectations of the patentholder and the alleged infringer would have been had they entered into an agreement at that time and had they acted reasonably in their negotiations.

In determining this, you must assume that both parties believed the '106 patent was valid and infringed and both parties were willing to enter into an agreement.

The reasonable royalty that you determine must be a royalty that would have resulted from the hypothetical negotiation and not simply a royalty that either party would have preferred.

In this case, the Plaintiff seeks a reasonable royalty. A reasonable royalty may be in the form of a lump sum where the patent owner receives a single, upfront payment as a royalty payment. You must be careful to ensure that the award is no more or no less than the value of the patented invention.

The patent law does not allow you to use the value of an entire product or a service or the value of the entire market to determine damages unless you find that the Plaintiff has proven that the patented feature of the product drives consumer demand for the entire product or service.

Evidence of things that happened after infringement first began can be considered in evaluating the reasonable royalty, but only to the extent that the evidence aids in assessing what the royalty would have resulted -- what royalty would have resulted from the hypothetical negotiation.

In determining the reasonable royalty, you should consider all the facts known and available to the parties at the time infringement began.

Some of the kinds of factors that you may consider in making your determination are:

- (1) the royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent-in-suit, proving or tending to prove an established royalty;
- (2) the commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as, whether they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of business or whether they are inventor and promoter;
- (3) the utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or devices, if any, that have been used for working out similar results;
- (4) the established profitability of the product made under the patent, its commercial success, and its current popularity;
- (5) the nature of the patented invention, the character of the commercial embodiment of it as owned and produced by the licensor, and the benefits to those who have used the invention;
- (6) the extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention and any evidence probative of the value of that use;

(7) the portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or significant features or improvements added by the infringer.

Now, members of the jury, no one of these factors is dispositive, and you can and you should consider all the evidence that's been presented to you in this case on each of these factors.

You may also consider other factors which, in your mind, would have increased or decreased the royalty the infringer would have been willing to pay and the patentholder would have been willing to accept acting as normally prudent business people as a part of this hypothetical negotiation.

The law requires that any damages awarded to the Plaintiff correspond to the value of the alleged invention, not to the value of features of Defendant's accused products that are not covered by the '106 patent. This is particularly true where, as here, the accused product has multiple features and multiple components.

Should you find any amount of damages to be due as compensation for infringement, then you should only award those damages which occurred from and after but not before January the 10th, 2012.

Now, with these instructions, members of the jury, 1 2 we're now ready to hear closing arguments from the attorneys in this case. 3 4 Mr. Maddox, Plaintiff may now present its first closing argument to the jury. 5 MR. MADDOX: Thank you, Your Honor. 6 THE COURT: You may proceed when you're ready. 7 MR. MADDOX: Ready, Your Honor. 8 Good morning. I would like to begin by thanking you on behalf of Danne Buchanan, PPS Data, for NetDeposit, 10 11 and from me and the trial team for your time and your 12 attention and the work we saw you putting in every day in 13 your books and paying attention. You were thrown into this patent world, which must 14 15 have seemed strange. You were very devout. You were given special meanings for words when they appeared in a patent 16 17 that may be different than they appear in the outside 18 world. And then for the last three days, you listened to hours of testimony about check processing, not the most 19 20 interesting topic in the world. 21 So thank you for hanging in there through all of 22 that. 23 This is my last chance to speak with you.

now, you know well that what matters is the evidence you

saw and heard and not what the lawyers say.

24

25

So I'm not going to speechify at you, but I'm going to review with you some of the evidence that we think is going to be important and useful in your deliberation process.

In our case, you heard from four witnesses. There were some smaller witnesses, but four main witnesses.

And the first one you heard from was Mr. Danne Buchanan. He was the inventor. He's the one who came up with a way to unchain banks from paper checks and planes, trains, and automobiles, and MICR reader/sorters and that sort of thing.

He figured out the architecture that allowed banks to do everything they needed to do, subject to all the regulations and business requirements. Everything they did with paper checks, but to do it with electronic data and images, and to do it all faster, cheaper, and safer.

From the evidence you heard, you can see that his was the first such system. He was the pioneer. Others had been experimenting with images, like Mr. Garrett, and scanners and different parts of the process, but Mr. Buchanan was the first one to pull it all together and make it work in the real world for banks.

From the very first step of the bank -- of the check being deposited at a remote site, to the very last step of the check image and check data being presented to

the Federal Reserve Bank or the maker bank to get paid, and to make everything in between meet the bank's requirements for accounting and operations, as well as regulatory requirements.

Now, that was a big deal, not because some lawyer is standing here and saying it was a big deal and not even because Mr. Buchanan stood here and said it was a big deal.

You know this is a big deal because Jack Henry's internal documents that we showed you during the trial say so. Indeed, it was a big deal even years after the invention in 2000.

You may recall the testimony of Mr. Moland, who had a blog he published for the company, and testified that RDC, remote deposit capture, was regarded as revolutionary in 2005. That's even five years later. Mr. Buchanan was way ahead of his time.

You also heard the corporate representative for Jack Henry, Mr. Phillips, testified that in the mid-2000s, well after the invention, Jack Henry's customers came to Jack Henry and said, you need to get into this -- this RDC field, it is going to be a big deal. 2005 it was still going to be a big deal.

Mr. Buchanan was before his time.

Then you met Mr. Jeff Johnson, and he's the president of PPS Data today, and he worked with

Mr. Buchanan. And he told you a bit about NetDeposit's growth and establishment as the technological leader in the 2000s, and he took you through NetDeposit's successful settlements with other players in the field for compromised royalties.

2.4

And then we got you into the patent itself with Dr. Michael Shamos. And Dr. Shamos is the only expert witness in this case who is not only an expert in computers but an expert in the application of computers to e-commerce and electric payment options.

For nearly 20 years he has taught a course specifically in electronic payment solutions at Carnegie Mellon University and at the University of Hong Kong. He founded and built the e-commerce department at his university.

Now, this is in contrast with Dr. Michalson because Dr. Michalson has no experience or expertise in the application of computers to check processing, electronic payments, e-commerce, or e-banking. His expertise is a pure computer science expertise, sort of like Mr. Boyd's expertise was a computer -- well, sort of like Mr. -- Mr. Boyd testified about code, but when it came to the real world of banking like when a check clears, he was kind of clueless.

So the first thing that Dr. Shamos did was he took

1 you through the Jack Henry products that we say infringe 2 the product -- infringe the patent.

And here they are. You've heard them many times. I will not recite them for you again. But these are the six products. And when we talk in the trial and talk in closing, these are -- we call them the accused products. They're all RD -- all RDC products of Jack Henry.

Then Dr. Shamos began at the beginning of Claim 1 with exactly what it took to infringe.

May I have PTX -- thank you.

And he started you with this language here, and he took you through a computer-readable medium having a program code, and when it's executed, that program code, when executed, capable of causing a machine to perform the following method steps.

So that it's a -- a system run by a program code, and the system itself has to be capable of doing these steps.

You'll note that there's no code in our claim. In fact, there's no code -- and I mean that almost looked like gibberish that Dr. Michalson talked about. There's no code anywhere in the patent.

There's functionality. There's requirements.

There's system requirements. There's system sequencing,

what -- whatever. There's many things, but there's no

1 code.

So what we're saying is it's not any particular kind of transaction that is the infringing thing here.

What is infringing is that Jack Henry's EPS system is a computer system run by code that one -- when executed, does -- is capable of doing these things.

It's Jack Henry's EPS system that infringes. It is an infringing system. And, as you heard the Judge say, any time you make, use, or sell an -- a patented invention, that's infringement.

They used this system many, many times over. They use an infringing system many times over.

The evidence you heard about what this system was capable when up and running, what it was programmed to be capable of, was fairly extensive.

And Dr. Shamos took you through Jack Henry's system, and he explained this was not his proof on the elements, but this was his background that you had the remote site, the central site, and then over there the maker banks. And the central site separate from the remote site, et cetera.

And then Dr. Shamos got into the element-by-element analysis of the claims. For instance -- may I have PTX-2, Column 24? Yes.

I'm going to talk mostly about two elements or

1 limitations that seem to be the center of the dispute most 2 in trial.

This first limitation I have here, we can call this the first transmitting limitation. You heard a lot about transmissions, and there have to be two. This is the first one.

And you can see, it says: The central system transmitting at least some of the deposit information of each different deposit transaction to the bank of first deposit.

Now, Dr. Shamos took you through this, and he showed you where in Jack Henry's own product manual, own user manual, it says: This is how you can transmit deposit data to the bank of first deposit.

May I have PDX-189?

This, in fact, was a slide he showed you, but this EPS financial institution reports -- you can see it. It says: Several reports are available that allow financial institution users to monitor transaction activity, review intraday and historical information, et cetera.

And the next slide.

He showed you some more excerpts from the user manual. This was direct evidence of what the system is capable of, according to Jack Henry itself.

But in addition to Dr. Shamos, each and every one

```
of Jack Henry's witnesses on cross-examination admitted
1
 2
   that the EPS system was capable of transmitting such
   deposit information to the bank of first deposit.
 3
            For instance, we had Mr. Boyd from Day 2.
 4
            So the financial institution's EPS account is
 5
   where the financial institution will see what checks have
 6
 7
   been processed by EPS, right?
            Yes.
 8
            And, again, Mr. Boyd -- I beg your pardon.
                                                         28 of
10
        There we go.
            Mr. Boyd, I asked in your deposition: Can you
11
12
   see -- you can read down a little bit. It says: So, yes.
   In the EPS account, we have the record of when the
13
   merchant, you know, deposited these transactions into the
14
   EPS -- into the financial institution's EPS account.
15
16
            We can go on to Mr. Moland, Day 2.
17
            I beg your pardon. That seems to be
18
   Dr. Michalson. May we have Mr. Moland? Here we are.
19
            And another thing a financial institution can do
20
   through its offered EPS access portal is to receive various
21
   reporting on its customers' check transactions, right?
22
            Yes.
23
            Even Dr. Michalson admitted this.
24
            And you can see here in his testimony, I asked him
25
   about this. I said: So what you're talking about is
```

```
deposit information for the bank of first deposit? And I
1
2
   asked him: Doesn't the EPS system have the capability, the
   way it's programmed, to transmit that deposit data back to
3
   the first -- bank of first deposit?
            And he said: Well, no, not as part of the deposit
5
   process. And then there was some objections, and
6
   eventually the Judge restated the question of: It's a
7
   straightforward question. Does the system have that
8
   capability? You need to answer that question.
            And he said: Well, yeah, it is possible to get
10
11
   information about deposits back from the system, yes.
12
            And then I asked him: And that information is
13
   transmitted to the bank of first deposit, yes?
14
            And he said: It is. It is sent in response to a
15
   user request.
16
            And I said: Only in response to a user request?
   Do you know?
17
18
            And he said: Well, I believe for some entities,
   it can be sent on a periodic basis.
19
20
            So the system is capable of that, as well?
21
            Yes.
22
                  Jack Henry's system was clearly capable of
23
   transmitting deposit information to the bank of first
24
   deposit, both through the portal and through the reports.
25
            Frankly, how could it have been otherwise.
```

There's no way banks of first deposit would just send off millions of dollars of checks to Jack Henry and say, well, I hope you tell me about them some day. Obviously, this is -- this is quite capable -- this is a capability of the system.

Now, the second disputed limitation -- may I have PTX-2?

It comes from the claim, and you can see it here.

The central system -- system, transmitting electronic check

data and check image data directly or indirectly to the

maker bank or to the Federal Reserve.

This is the part of the process where the check image and data gets basically presented for payment. So, frankly, of course, the system does that.

And, again, Dr. Shamos provided you with documents and the testimony from Jack Henry's employees that confirmed this. And, again, every single Jack Henry witness admitted on cross -- cross-examination that the EPS system, as programmed, was capable of transmitting these electronic check data and check image in what were called Check 21 files.

And, in fact, there was talk about them being called Fed files because they're going to the Fed.

Transmitting these Check 21 files to the Federal Reserve or the maker banks.

```
May I have Mr. Boyd's testimony from Day 2?
 1
 2
            Question: Mr. Boyd, for banking customers, the
   Check 21 file with an EPS computer environment may be sent
 3
   to a paying bank to clear the check, right?
 4
            That's correct.
 5
            Okay. That's the maker bank.
 6
 7
            And Mr. Boyd's next testimony: One of the outputs
   is to the direct to Fed, which is the Federal Reserve Bank,
 8
   right?
10
            Mr. Boyd: That's correct.
11
            So Jack Henry's EPS system has the capability of
12
   taking Check 21 files and sending them direct to Fed,
   right?
13
14
            For direct to merchants, yes.
15
            May I have Mr. Moland's testimony?
16
            Question: One downstream process after EPS has
   created the Check 21 files is to send the Check 21 files
17
18
   to, for example, a Federal Reserve Bank?
19
            Yes.
20
            And Mr. Moland's testimony again:
                                                Sure.
   you know that EPS can send it to, meaning the Check 21
21
22
   transactions, to a Federal Reserve Bank?
23
            Yes.
24
            Even Dr. Michalson, I asked him: The Check 21
25
   file produced by the EPS system can only go to one place,
```

correct? 1 2 Correct. And that can be the Federal Reserve Bank? 3 It can be. 4 It can be the maker bank? 5 It can be one of a variety of different banks. 6 7 So it can be the maker bank? Yes, if it knew what the maker bank was. 8 And this is a system that is capable of sending the check image and -- and data to either -- directly or 10 11 indirectly to a Federal Reserve Bank or a maker bank. 12 THE COURT: You've used 17 minutes, counsel. 13 MR. MADDOX: Thank you. Finally, Dr. Shamos gave the evidence from Jack 14 15 Henry's own description of its EPS system about the -- the repeated list of internal systems, the MICR reader, cash 16 17 deposit system, et cetera. And he explained why and how. 18 And you may recall his slides. 19 The central system in his system was -- which is 20 the Kansas site, was separate from the bank of first 21 deposit's MICR system, accounting system, cash system, 22 float processing system. They were all separate. 23 the whole point of the invention, that they get bypassed and not used. 2.4 25 You then heard from Dr. Keith Ugone, who I hope

you think did a good job explaining some of the factors

His Honor just discussed with you.

And I should point out that Dr. Ugone's testimony is not rebutted by any expert. They could not find an expert to come here and say, no, Dr. Ugone got it wrong. It shouldn't be 1.4 billion transactions. They couldn't find an expert to come here and say, no, Dr. Ugone got it wrong. It shouldn't be a penny.

And so they also couldn't find an expert to come here and say, and so, Dr. Ugone got it wrong. It should not be \$14 million. There's no evidence to that. We'll hear attorney argument about it, but there's no evidence.

Now, finally, let's talk about the code -- the source code. This was a red herring from the beginning.

And you were finally going to get the payoff from this long promised code thing from Dr. William Michalson.

And you may recall, he said: Ah, I have the code that shows it cannot infringe. And he took you through a bunch of snippets.

And he said: Well, this code does this, and it doesn't have anything to do with it.

But then he finally got to one, and he said:
Well, this code, MOVEit, it was called, can send the
Check 21 file either to a maker bank or to the Federal
Reserve, but not both.

And that's as well may be. You wouldn't have checks sent to multiple places to get paid. But that's not the same thing at all as saying the system was not capable of sending the Check 21 files to the Federal Reserve or to a maker bank. It's not at all.

What's really kind of happening here is Jack Henry knows its internal documents, and its own employees' testimony describes all the functionality in the patent.

So they've been sort of trying to sell you this notion that it's not enough that their system is capable of performing the things in the patent. Somehow PPS Data has to go to the code and show you the code that makes it happen.

But that's not what the patent claims. The patent claims a system that is capable of performing these functions, period.

As you saw, the patent is not a code claim. It's not a programming product. The system, any system, is capable, if it's -- if a system is capable of doing something, it's because there's been programming put into it to do it.

You may recall my last question to Dr. Michalson on cross-examination was whether he could tell me if the Microsoft Word, word processing, was capable of performing spell check.

And he said: Yes, it is. 1 2 And he did that without looking at the code, because he had direct evidence of the functionality. 3 Either he had read the manual or he had used it. 4 That's what Dr. Shamos has here, direct evidence 5 of the functionality in Jack Henry's user manuals, 6 7 documents, and the testimony of its own employees. Finally, one note, Dr. Michalson's 8 non-infringement opinions about the other claims, 2 through 6 and 9, all come down to, well, if you don't infringe 10 Claim 1, therefore, you can't infringe the rest. So if you 11 12 find infringement of Claim 1, there's no evidence of 13 non-infringement of the rest of them, and you should find infringement on all of them. 14 15 We suggest that Dr. Shamos's testimony, especially when corroborated by all the J -- the Jack Henry employee 16 17 testimony, makes it very much more than likely that there 18 was infringement in this case. 19 Thank you. 20 THE COURT: Defendant may now present its closing 21 argument to the jury. 22 Mr. Heidrick, you may begin when you're ready. 23 MR. HEIDRICK: Thank you, Your Honor. 24 Jay Heidrick on behalf of Defendant, Jack Henry. 25 I first want to begin thanking you, ladies of the

jury, for your time and your attention as well. As

Mr. Maddox said, you've heard a lot of different stuff this

week about a lot of different things in a place that seems

foreign to a lot of people who don't normally practice here

like we do every day.

I think, as attorneys, we probably take for granted that things that we're comfortable with and things that we do and that are just normal nomenclature to us are foreign to you, and so we take for granted things that we maybe should take more time to explain or things that we should offer you more explanation on and give you that courtesy.

And I'm certain that's -- we failed at that this week at times. And despite that, you've been incredible in your attention and your effort with this, and I really thank you for that.

And I'd also like to thank Judge Gilstrap and his staff, as well as opposing counsel, for making a trial go really smoothly this week, as well.

There are two issues for you to remember here.

The first is that Jack Henry does not infringe the patent, and second, is that the patent is invalid. Those are the two over -- overarching issues that you just have to remember as you hear the evidence, as you do your deliberations, as you hear me talk. The patent is invalid,

Jack Henry does not infringe.

I'd like to go back to Monday when I had the opportunity to meet you for the first time, and I gave you a preview of what this case was going to entail, and that's the first thing I told you, is that we do it differently.

We don't do what -- what PPS Data's patent says.

And I also told you how PPS Data is moving its fence, how it's breaking its deal with the Patent Office and trying to cover Jack Henry's products; that the Patent Office gave it a very narrow, delineated, and then scope of the invention, and it's trying to expand that.

And we've seen that during this trial. And we just heard from Mr. Maddox who said -- showed you Claim 1 of the claim that says computer-readable program code, and two breaths later said this isn't about code. The claim says code in it. The Judge's instructions said code. This case is all about code.

Let's look at Mr. Buchanan, the first witness PPS Data called. And what did he tell you?

He testified that his invention changed the industry. He talked about how it allowed customers to deposit checks remotely rather than having to come into the bank and how it revolutionized everything. He talked about the fraud monitoring and how it prevented fraud on checks.

But you remember when I asked him a very simple

question, where does the term remote site appear in the claims of the patent? The Judge just instructed you the claims of the invention. Not the figures, not the descriptions. The claims.

And I asked him, where does the term remote site appear in your -- in your claim? And he kind of hemmed and hawed and said, well, I can show you where it's at in the figures. And I said, no, where is it at in the claims? He couldn't show you because it's not there.

And then I asked him, can you tell me where the term fraud monitoring is and he kind of hemmed and hawed again. He said that, you know, he wasn't really familiar with the patent claims. He actually said he'd have to talk to his patent lawyer or something like that.

He claims to have invented this revolutionary technology, but he doesn't know what's in his own claims, what's in his own invention, the legal scope of his invention.

And as you know just by reading plain English, the terms remote and fraud monitoring that Mr. Buchanan talked about don't appear anywhere in the claims. The claims are the true legal fence line.

NetDeposit may have come up with a great idea, a great business idea, but that business idea that it tried to develop is not what is legally protected by the patent.

They're trying to expand what's in their claim. They're breaking their deal with the government to try and cover a business idea that's just simply not there.

Another thing I told you about on Monday is that PPS Data would not be able to carry its burden of proof to show infringement because Jack Henry doesn't infringe. It does it differently.

I want to show you the Judge's instructions that he just read, and you'll have a packet of these.

Can I have the ELMO, please?

This is the first thing that's important. The highlighted version. If the accused product omits even a single requirement of the claim, then you must find that the accused product does not infringe that claim.

That's what I told you on Monday. One difference is all it takes.

Mr. Maddox talked about "capable of" and said this is not a source code claim. This -- the code doesn't matter. The Judge's instructions tell you otherwise.

In the context of this term, "capable of" means the accused products must have program code present that satisfies the limitations.

Once you read these instructions and apply them to the facts of the case, your decision is really easy. Why? Because the instructions say that PPS Data must prove that

1 the accused products have actual program code in them that
2 satisfy every limitation of the claim.

Remember, it's the claim limitations that determine infringement. PPS Data has zero proof of any program code that is present in the accused instrumentalities, much less code that satisfies every limitation.

Conversely, Dr. Michalson showed you and explained to you not only that Jack Henry doesn't infringe but how it can't infringe.

PPS Data can't show you the necessary evidence.

Game over. The code wins.

But let's talk a little bit about what PPS Data did try to show you. And I was -- as I was thinking about this last night of how to relay this to you, the thing that kept popping into my mind was a few weeks ago I took my seven-year-old son to see Spiderman, the new Spiderman movie.

At the end of the movie, Spiderman defeats the villain. And he goes back to New York, and he's swinging through Times Square with Mary Jane. And, all of a sudden, they see this video in Times Square of Spiderman being the villain, of doing something wrong.

And everyone is looking up. And, Spiderman, why would you do this? And what had happened was, there was

another villain who had been recording Spiderman the entire time and had spliced out different things and taken snippets of little things and strung them all together and was able to create a video that made it look like Spiderman was doing something wrong.

And I went back after I thought of that, and I looked at Dr. Shamos's presentation from Tuesday, all these manuals that they say exist. And I looked at his citations from the sections where he tried to explain how Jack Henry's products infringe.

And you may have noticed this, too. But

Dr. Shamos relied on user manuals, 10 different manuals

that he pieced together for his infringement analysis. He

didn't show you a single manual and take you through it.

He took a little bit from here, a little bit from there, threw in some deposition quotes, into this big mixing bowl. Voila, "capable of."

I promise you that if someone was recording me this entire week, you could take pieces of what I said throughout the entire week and you could create a recording that says -- that makes it sound like I'm saying Jack Henry infringes. I would never say that, you know that, and I didn't say that.

But if you get enough small pieces of stuff from everywhere, you can create any picture you want. But that

picture isn't always the truth.

I told you on the first day, too, the claim requires two transmissions, one to the bank of first deposit. And PPS Data used this piecemeal approach to argue that a reporting function that may never leave Jack Henry and is sent to a customer is a transmission to the bank of first deposit.

But they never tied anything up with that. They didn't show you that the reporting is part of the deposit transactions.

As the Judge said, the preamble is limiting in this case. The preamble talks about deposit processing. They didn't show you how this reporting function is part of the deposit processing process. They didn't show you how the reporting is done and how a bank goes about to get -- get it by the claim.

These -- the reports that they're relying on are only created after the deposit processing is done. You know why? Because there's nothing to report until the process is completed. You cannot create the report until the deposit is done. They didn't tell you that.

And let's take this in -- one of the things

Judge Gilstrap read to you in his instructions is common sense, and that is something that probably too much gets lost a lot of times in cases.

And let's take their argument to this legal -- or to its logical conclusion. Let's use common sense.

This is from Dr. Shamos's presentation, Kevin Moland. It talks about, if a customer wanted to access check information of any transactions with that bank, it could, right?

Answer, I believe that's true. I don't know that -- yes, yes, it can.

So under this scenario, deposit process is completed, it's done. There is this reporting function that sits out there.

Six months later a customer wants to log in through the portal, wants to pull up, did the check I sent to my nephew clear last? I can't recall when that was.

Looks at it, downloads it, maybe even prints it. According to them, looking at it six months later is part of that deposit process.

That's not common sense. And even what Mr. Maddox just showed you with the slides before, if you read the language in there, it talks about the financial institution's user can -- can look up -- the user can pull these down, the user can get these reports. That's the user using that, not the bank. Not at least what he just showed you. It's nothing more than the box score after the game is over.

Now, let's contrast that with Jack Henry's case. We showed you one manual. That was representative of all the products. We started, and you remember, there was probably -- there was like a log-in screen, and Mr. Wietjes asked Dr. Michalson, is this the source code?

He said, no, this is what you see. It's the HTML representation of it.

And so we went there and we showed you how a user would log in, where she would put her user name and password in.

And then we stopped, and it got kind of jumbled because we were going back and forth. We said Step 1, here's where you log in. Step 2, here's the source code that shows that. Here's the next step in the -- in the process. Here's the source code. Here's the next step. Here's the source code. And we went through all of that with one manual.

Dr. Michalson showed you how the Check 21 file goes to one location, one transmission. Why didn't Dr. Shamos just look at the source code? That's exactly what the claim says. Program code. And we made it available to him. But he testified that he didn't need it.

If you recall his testimony, one of the first things he talked about was how massive the written file was in this case and how he had to scour over all of the --

through the manuals and paper that Jack Henry produced and PPS Data even scoured the Internet making print-offs that he had to review all those things.

And when he was asked by PPS Data's counsel as to why he didn't just look at the source code, he said, I didn't need to. I had all the stuff in the manuals that I needed. I didn't need to go back and look at things.

Okay. Well, let's use a little more common sense here.

So rather than just spending a few hours on a claim that talks about program code to go -- rather than just spend a few hours to go look at the code, Dr. Shamos spent days, weeks, however long, scouring through all these manuals to find snippets of what he could use. He chose to spend that time, instead of just seeing what the code says.

Why is that? Why go through all that work to review those things when you could have just looked at the code? Because he didn't want to. He knew if he went and looked at the code and said -- and he didn't like what it said, there was no getting around that.

But he knew that if he could take the manuals and perform the Spiderman analysis, take a little bit from here, little bit from there, throw in some depos, throw it in the mixing bowl, throw it all together, and say, look, "capable of," he knew he couldn't get out of it if he looked at the code.

It took Dr. Shamos three hours and 122 slides to spell out his infringement theory, and he still couldn't show it.

It took Jack Henry's expert, Dr. Michalson, 25 minutes, one manual, and four -- four to five citations to the source code to explain to you why Jack Henry can't infringe.

And when PPS Data examined him about the source code, it wasn't about the content of the code. It wasn't about his analysis of the code. They just asked him why he didn't review all of the code. It was over a million lines of code here. They knew they couldn't challenge the content of the code. That's why they didn't go after it.

The jury instructions say that PPS Data must show you that the accused instrumentalities have program code present that satisfy the claim limitations.

Like I told you on Monday, the code always wins.

PPS Data has no code. Jack Henry has the code. Jack Henry wins.

PPS Data also has not shown you a single infringing transaction.

Would you -- the next slide.

You may recall this. This is the hypothetical where I took Dr. Shamos through the on-us items, and this is where I said: We both bank at First State Bank, and I

```
write you a check and you use Jack Henry's systems to
1
   deposit at First State Bank. And the check goes to First
 2
   State Bank, and it goes out of my account and into his.
 3
   And there's only one bank that's used.
            Let's go to the next slide, please.
            And after I took Dr. Shamos through this analysis,
 6
7
   I asked him if this type of on-us transaction would meet
   the limitations of Claim 1. And he said: It would not
 8
   meet the limitations of Claim 1 because it's an on-us
10
   transaction.
11
            Well, I wanted to make sure this wasn't a
12
   hypothetical situation, that this wasn't something that we
   were just dealing with in a vacuum.
13
14
            And I said: Does Jack Henry process transactions
   like this?
15
16
            He said: I would assume they do.
            Then we talked a little bit about the Fed and
17
18
   why -- why would someone for an on-us transaction send
19
   something to the Fed.
20
            And he said: They wouldn't.
21
            And I said: Can you name a single Jack Henry bank
22
   client that instructs Jack Henry to send the file to the
23
   Fed as opposed to send it back to us for on-us items?
2.4
            And he said: No, I can't.
25
            So he admits that on-us items don't meet the
```

limitations of Claim 1. He admits Jack -- those transactions are processed by Jack Henry.

We also talked about the bank or non-bank -- the direct merchant clients, which you also saw in Mr. Boyd's testimony. I talked about that with Dr. Shamos. And we went through and we talked about the merchant customers and how those don't have contracts directly with Jack Henry.

And he admitted he didn't do a separate analysis for those. He didn't do the basic work required.

We took element-by-element, and we talked about whether or not there would be a bank of first deposit. And he said -- he admitted that if there is no bank of first deposit, then Claim 1 cannot be met because there is no transmission to the bank of first deposit.

You may recall on Monday, too, that I said it would be interesting to see if PPS Data can show you a single transaction, a single transaction flow that went through that checked every box, or if Jack Henry could show even a single customer that checked every box. They were sitting in the courtroom with all of us. They heard that.

And what did we see? We saw pieced together manuals. We saw snippets of testimony. I would think that if Jack Henry's system was capable of infringing, as they say, and there are 1.4 billion transactions at issue, as they say, that they could have shown you one that checks

1 every box.

We did. We showed you how the on-us items don't infringe. How is it that Jack Henry was able to do that but PPS Data wasn't? It's easy. The code -- the code wins, Jack Henry doesn't infringe.

Also on Monday, I talked to you a little bit about the terms that we used in this case and making sure that we keep bank of first deposit correct because there are a lot of foreign terms in this case and making sure that we're using the terms of the patent and not in terms of how those are used in every day business.

Again, they were here the entire time. They heard me say it. And what did we hear from PPS Data? Did you hear the delineations about how a particular bank term is used in a particular transaction or how it's used to delineate anything other than an overarching 50,000-foot level?

But my concerns were real. Here's an example of what happened on Tuesday.

On the left is Dr. Shamos's testimony. There was some testimony that was read into the -- into the record. And one of them was from Ms. Malini Boddu. She's a programmer with Jack Henry. And Dr. Shamos relied on this during his direct testimony. And in Malini's -- or in Ms. Boddu's testimony, she talked about how there is a file

that is sent to the bank.

And then in the direct testimony, Dr. Shamos was asked: And the reference to the bank there, what is that referencing?

And he said: Oh, the maker bank.

I said -- and we went on on cross-examination, if you look at that on the right, I asked him where he got that. How could he testify that that was the maker bank versus what was read?

At the very end, I asked him: So this very well could be the bank client that we just talked about, as well, couldn't it?

I suppose it could.

This is just another one of many examples of PPS Data grabbing for any piece it can put together, another example of it trying to move its fence.

Let's talk a little bit about the separate from the bank of first deposit that was at issue yesterday. And you may recall this took up the bulk of Dr. Michalson's testimony or his cross-examination, at least, yesterday.

And according to Claim 1, the central system has to be separate from the enumerated systems for a bank of first deposit.

And Dr. Michalson opined that Jack Henry works on behalf of the bank of first deposit. It works for the bank

```
of first deposit. Therefore, the systems that are at
1
 2
   Jack Henry are not separate from those systems for a bank
   of first deposit.
 3
            "For" is not a construed claim term in this case.
 4
   And Judge Gilstrap instructed you that you should apply the
 5
 6
   ordinary and plain meaning as seen by one of a person of
 7
   ordinary skill in the art.
            The word "for" is not the word "of." For example,
 8
   I would much rather make a meal for a friend than I would
10
   make a meal of a friend. "For" and "of" are different.
11
            This is just another reason why Jack Henry does
12
   not infringe.
            I want to look at the damages issue now.
13
                                                       We'll
   talk a little bit about that and talk about
14
15
   Judge Gilstrap's instructions to you on that angle.
16
            And here's the first instruction.
            May I have the ELMO, please? Thank you.
17
18
            The first thing is that the -- PPS Data is not
19
   required to prove its damages with mathematical precision.
20
   It must prove them with reasonable certainty. The
21
   Plaintiff is not entitled to damages that are remote or
22
   speculative.
23
            And that's important because when we read the
24
   next -- I'm trying to get them both on the same page for
25
   you here.
```

```
This is important on the remote and speculative,
 1
 2
   because the law requires that any damages awarded to
   Plaintiff correspond to the value of the alleged invention,
 3
   not to the value of features of Defendant's accused
 4
   products that are not covered by the '106 patent.
 6
            This is particularly true where, as here, the
7
   accused product has multiple features and multiple
   components.
 8
            THE COURT: You have five minutes remaining,
10
   counsel.
11
            MR. HEIDRICK: Thank you, Your Honor.
12
            As the instruction says, you can't award damages
   that are speculative. We talked earlier that Dr. Shamos
13
14
   admits that at least some of the transactions don't
   infringe Claim 1. Therefore, if they don't infringe
15
16
   Claim 1, they can't infringe the dependent claims.
            So we asked Dr. Shamos --
17
18
            If we could switch back, please. Thank you.
19
            -- which actual transactions did he say infringe?
20
            He said: Well, it's capable of.
21
            And I said: Which transactions are claiming
22
   actually infringe here -- out of the 1.4 billion, which
23
   ones?
24
            And he said: I didn't do a damage report.
25
            And I said: Can you tell the ladies and gentlemen
```

```
of the jury -- I messed that up -- how many transactions
1
2
   are processed in the infringing manner, which you just
   testified to about earlier?
3
            So his pieced together infringement claim, how
 4
   many transactions actually infringe?
 6
            Same answer:
                          No.
7
            So since he's not a damages guy, we waited for
8
   their damages guy.
            And we asked him: So you haven't done any
   analysis of your own about transactions that infringe in
10
   this situation or if any do; is that correct?
11
12
            And he said: I would agree with you. I'm not the
13
   technical person.
14
            We asked the technical person. He said: It's a
15
   damages issue. We asked the damages guy. He said:
16
   technical issue.
17
            What does that mean? It means they haven't shown
18
   any transactions that infringe. They haven't shown proof
   of any damages. And they also haven't done it because they
19
20
   haven't shown infringement.
21
            I want to talk briefly about the invalidity of the
22
    '106 patent. And as Judge Gilstrap said, this is our
23
   burden, and we accept it. And it's our burden by clear and
```

And it means you have to look at the claim

24

convincing evidence.

elements alone and in ordered combination. If you look at the individual limitations of every claim, you'll see that it's just general computer components functioning in their 3 ordinary operating ways, things that they've been doing forever.

No one claims they invented the computer. Titus admitted they did not invent transmission methods. Everything in this patent existed as of April 2000.

So then we looked at the combination. We put them all together. And we say: Was this invented? Was this routine and conventional?

12 No.

1

2

4

5

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7

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25

The issue of separate from, you can take a check processing system that existed at a bank as of April 2000, all the same components, same processes, same software, everything, move it across the street, and it's separate from. That's their inventive concept.

Talk -- you heard a little bit about the comparing elements. Jerry Garrett testified as to SuperImage, how that was routine and conventional. And 30 banks. talked about the -- the functions that it performed, how it performed -- it was in supermarkets. How remote -accessing remote information was not new. Sending check images was not new.

Ron Titus testified yesterday, you -- if you have

information, you can send it wherever you want. 1 2 I want to talk real briefly about the verdict form here. 3 How is my time, Your Honor? 4 THE COURT: You have two minutes, more or less. 5 MR. HEIDRICK: Thank you. 6 7 Here's the verdict form. Did PPS Data prove by a preponderance of the 8 evidence that Jack Henry directly infringed any claim of -any asserted claim of the '106 patent? 10 11 The answer here is no. 12 Did Jack Henry prove by clear and convincing evidence that the patent is invalid? 13 The answer to every claim here is yes. Jack Henry 14 15 didn't infringe. The patent is invalid. 16 PPS Data told you Jack Henry infringed. Jack Henry showed you it didn't. 17 18 As I told you on Monday, this case is very personal to Jack Henry and to me. For two years, we've 19 20 litigated this case, waiting for this day to come before 21 you and get the justice we've been seeking. 22 I'm done. I have nothing more to give. No more 23 arguments I can make. Nothing more I can do. I'm giving 24 it to you now. And I trust in you when you review the 25 evidence, when you apply the Judge's instructions, that you

```
will come to the correct result and find that Jack Henry
1
2
   does not infringe, that the patent is invalid.
            It has truly been an honor to try this case before
3
   you this week. On behalf of myself, our trial team, and
4
   most importantly, Jack Henry, thank you.
6
            THE COURT: All right. Plaintiff may now present
7
   its final closing arguments.
            Mr. Maddox, you have six minutes and 15 seconds
8
   remaining.
10
            MR. MADDOX: Thank you, Judge.
11
            THE COURT: I'll warn you at two minutes
12
   remaining?
13
            MR. MADDOX: That'd be lovely. Thank you.
14
            THE COURT: You may proceed.
15
            MR. MADDOX: Okay. So a few things.
   fundamental problem with what you just heard is, where is
16
   the code? Where is code?
17
18
            It is undisputed. No one has ever disagreed that
   the only way a computer system does something or can do
19
20
   something is if the computer programmer tells it to.
21
            Your iPhone or your phone does a whole bunch of
22
           That's because there's code in it telling it to do
23
   something. In fact, in his opening, Mr. Heidrick talked
24
   about how the code controls the computer. Right. The code
   controls the program.
25
```

And then when you see the program and it does these functions, it's because the code is telling it to.

No one has said otherwise. No one would ever say otherwise because computers and software don't have their own free will.

Let's look at the Judge's instructions here, similar to what Mr. Heidrick put up there.

And as I indicated just a half-hour ago, the patent is written in such a way that it's not transactions. It's not things done and the nature of the transactions. It's the use of the infringing system.

And Judge Gilstrap instructed you, in fact,

depending on the claims, an accused device -- the system -may be found to infringe if it is reasonably capable of
satisfying the claim limitations, even though it may also
be capable of non-infringing modes of operation.

So even if you mistake Mr. Heidrick's hypotheticals of what if there's no bank of first deposit at all or what if it's on-us or -- or what if the customer wants us to send it to Finland -- I mean, it doesn't matter. They -- their system is infringing, and they used it over and over and over.

We are not claiming transmissions -- transactions. We are claiming the system.

With respect to invalidity, you heard an attorney

tell you it was routine, conventional, and well-known. You didn't hear Dr. Michalson say that. You didn't hear Dr. Michalson say any combination of the claim limitations were routine, conventional, or well-known.

Don't mistake what attorneys say for actual evidence from competent experts, even -- it's not a he said/she said. Dr. Michalson didn't say it at all. He dared not because it's so obviously not true.

But the point is, the evidence in the record, there is none. The only evidence that came in was Mr. Garrett, who, frankly, a very credible witness. Nice man. And he was one of those people who was experimenting with bits and pieces of the process, but you heard that his system still used a MICR reader to do its thing.

And you also heard the images didn't go to the Fed, they went other places, too -- for storage and research and other things.

And you also heard -- like I said, a very nice man, but he had approximately 30 banks -- he had two banks in 1995 -- not really clear in 2000. But even if he had 30 banks in 2000, and as he said, there were about eight to 10,000 banks in the United States, that comes to about .3 percent of the market. .3 percent of the banks out there does not make something routine, ordinary, and conventional in the banking industry.

There's really no question to us that you cannot have clear and convincing evidence without expert testimony saying this is the combination and here is why it's routine.

THE COURT: Two minutes remaining.

MR. MADDOX: You don't have any of that, nor based on Mr. Garrett.

In the end -- oh, I beg your pardon. May I have PTX-288?

Here is the exhibit where -- where Dr. Ugone got his transaction data. And you will see Check 21, there's no breakdown of Check 21. So even if it mattered what the transactions were, they didn't give us the information to distinguish them.

But you'll note that they used the EPS system for ACH transactions and other transactions. Even though they used our infringing system, we only asked for damages on the Check 21 transactions. We were being conservative.

Finally, in the end, do think back to the opening, do think back to what we told you we thought the evidence would show, and think about whether the evidence did show that. And also recall the extent to which basically the response was indignation and counter accusation.

We've all in life dealt with someone, whom when you confronted them with it, gets very indignant and very

accusatory and starts talking a mile an hour. This is Jack Henry's defense. There really is none. Its employees, its testimony, its user manuals, and common sense left you no other choice.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Members of the jury, I'd like to now give you a few final instructions before you begin your deliberations.

You must perform your duty as jurors without bias or prejudice as to any party. The law does not permit you to be controlled by sympathy, prejudice, or public opinion.

All parties expect that you will carefully and impartially consider all the evidence, follow the law as I have given it to you, and reach a just verdict regardless of the consequences.

Answer each question in the verdict form from the facts as you find them to be in this case, following the instructions that the Court has given you. As I've said, do not decide who you think should win and then answer the questions accordingly.

I remind you, your answers and your verdict must be unanimous.

You should consider and decide this case as a dispute between persons of equal standing in the community, of equal worth, and holding the same or similar stations in

1 life.

This is true in patent cases between corporations, partnerships, individuals. A patent owner is entitled to protect its rights under the laws of the United States.

This includes bringing a suit in a United States District Court for money damages for infringement.

The law recognizes no distinction among types of parties. All corporations, partnerships, organizations, and individuals stand equal before the law, regardless of their size, regardless of who owns them, and all such entities are to be treated as equals.

Now, when you retire to the jury room to deliberate on your verdict, you will each, as I've told you, have a copy of these final jury instructions to take with you.

If during your deliberations you desire to review any of the exhibits which the Court has admitted into evidence and which you've seen during the trial, then you should advise me by a written note delivered to the Court Security Officer, and I will then send that exhibit or those exhibits to you.

Once you retire, you should first select your foreperson and then conduct your deliberations. If you recess during your deliberations, follow all the instructions that the Court has given you about your

conduct throughout the trial.

After you have reached a unanimous verdict, your foreperson is then to fill in the verdict form with the answers that reflect your unanimous decisions. Sign the verdict form, date it, and then advise the Court Security Officer you have reached a verdict.

Do not reveal your answers until such time as you're discharged, unless otherwise directed by me, and you must never disclose to anyone, not even to me, your numerical division on any question.

Any notes that you've taken over the course of the trial are aids to your memory only. If your memory should differ from your notes, then you should rely on your memory and not your notes. The notes are not evidence.

A juror who has not taken notes should rely on her own independent recollection of the evidence and should not be unduly influenced by the notes of other jurors. Notes are not entitled to any greater weight than the recollection and -- or impression of each juror who took them about the testimony and the evidence.

If during your deliberations you want to communicate with me at any time, you should give a message or a question written by the jury foreperson to the Court Security Officer who will then bring it to me. I will then respond as promptly as possible either by writing or by

having you brought back into the courtroom where I can
address you orally.

I will always first disclose to the attorneys in the case your question and my response before I answer any question.

After you've reached a verdict and I've discharged you as jurors, I want you to understand you're not required to talk with anyone about your service in this case unless the Court orders otherwise.

By the same token, at that point, when you've returned a verdict and I have accepted it and I have discharged you as jurors, then you are completely free to talk about the case with anyone that you choose to talk about the case with. The choice will be up to you and you alone at that point in time.

I'm now going to hand one clean copy of the verdict form and eight copies of these final instructions to the jury to the Court Security Officer to deliver to you in the verdict -- or, excuse me, to deliver to you in the jury room.

Members of the jury, you may now retire to the jury room to deliberate. We await your verdict.

COURT SECURITY OFFICER: All rise.

(Jury out.)

25 COURT SECURITY OFFICER: Be seated, please.

```
THE COURT: Counsel, while the jury deliberates,
 1
 2
   you are welcome to wait here in the courtroom or elsewhere
   in the courthouse. You are also free to wait at any
 3
   offsite location.
            In the event you're going to be outside of the
 5
   building, you should make sure that my staff has a good,
 6
 7
   working cell phone number where we can call you in the
   event we receive a note or at the time we receive a return
 8
   of the verdict.
10
            With that and awaiting either a note from the jury
11
   or a return of their verdict, the Court stands in recess.
12
            COURT SECURITY OFFICER: All rise.
13
            (Recess.)
14
            (Jury out.)
15
            COURT SECURITY OFFICER: All rise.
            THE COURT: Be seated, please.
16
17
            Counsel, we've received a note from the jury.
18
   I thought I brought two copies out here so that each side
19
   could have a copy.
20
            Let's go make a copy of that, please.
21
            COURTROOM DEPUTY: Okay.
22
                       I'll have a copy in just a minute for
            THE COURT:
23
   each side to see and look at. In the meantime, I'll read
24
   the note to you. I'll also indicate for the record that
   I've marked this note in the upper right-hand corner with
25
```

```
a 1 and a circle to identify it as the first note from the
1
 2
   jury in regard to this trial.
            This note reads as follows: Could we get the
 3
   following items for the jury?
 4
                KP-1 [sic] spreadsheet.
 5
            2.
                Large drawing stand.
 6
 7
            3.
               Robert Ledbetter deposition.
            4. Jack Henry flowchart.
 8
 9
            Thank you, comma, Mary Troboy.
            So it appears Ms. Troboy, who was Juror No. 4, is
10
11
   the foreperson.
12
            Now, if lead counsel for both parties will
   approach, I have a copy of the actual note for you each to
13
14
   look at.
15
            MR. SON: Thank you.
16
            THE COURT: My intention is to send this easel in
   the courtroom with the markers to them that will address
17
   Item No. 2.
18
19
            I'd like you all to consult with each other and
20
   see if you can agree on what the KP-1 [sic] spreadsheet is.
21
   I believe it must be an exhibit used during the trial.
22
            The Jack -- the Robert Ledbetter deposition,
```

obviously, I cannot send to them, and I have a response prepared. In a moment I'll go over it with you.

25

And the Jack Henry flowchart I am assuming is a

demonstrative, and if it is, obviously I can't send a demonstrative to the jury.

Let me go off the record and let counsel consult with each other briefly as to both what the KP-1 [sic] spreadsheet is and confirming that the Jack Henry flowchart addresses a demonstrative that was used.

We're off the record.

(Off the record discussion.)

THE COURT: Let's go back on the record.

While we've been off the record, I have conferred with counsel with regard to the jury's note and the request set forth therein. It is my understanding that responding to the jury's note, both parties are agreeable that the requests for the KPI spreadsheet in the jury's note relates to Exhibit PTX-288. And with the agreement of both parties, I intend to send that exhibit back in response to the jury's Note No. 1.

I think everyone is in agreement that the large easel in the courtroom will be sent back to the jury with the markers and the tray below it in response to their request for a large drawing stand.

My -- my proposed response to the jury with regard to the Robert Ledbetter deposition, indicating I cannot send the jury deposition testimony and they have to rely on the memory -- their memory of all the testimony during the

trial, including testimony presented by deposition, appears to be agreeable to the parties.

And with regard to the fourth request identified in the jury's note as Jack Henry flowchart, the parties appear to be in agreement that that's represented by PT -- Exhibit PTX-288, which is a spreadsheet of 10 distinct tabs, and while off the record, all 10 tabs have been printed, and a printed copy of PTX-288, as I intend to send it back to the jury, has been given to both sides, and they seem satisfied that that is the entirety of the spreadsheet and corresponds with the jury's request.

Consequently, I will read for the record the written response I intend to send to the jury, and then I'll ask both sides to offer a comment about whether they have any objections or agree to this written response.

My intended response to the jury in response to Jury Note No. 1 is as follows:

Members of the jury, in response to your Jury Note
No. 1, please find the following:

One, the KPI spreadsheet, which you requested, appears to be PTX-288, which I've printed and am sending to you. If this is not what you requested, please let me know by a second separate note. If this is what you wanted, then no follow-up note to me is necessary, and I will assume this exhibit addresses your request.

Two, I am sending you a large easel with markers for your use as you requested.

Three, you also asked for, quote, the Robert

Ledbetter deposition, close quote. I cannot send this to

you. You will have to rely on your memory of witness

testimony presented at trial, both from live witnesses in

open court and from deposition witnesses presented to you

as part of the trial.

Four, as to the, quote, Jack Henry flowchart, close quote, I am sending you Exhibit PTX-43. If this is not what you requested, please let me know by a second separate note. If this is what you wanted, then no follow-up note to me is necessary, and I will assume this exhibit addresses your request.

Coupled with that, I will send the jury PTX-43 and the printed version of PTX-288 and direct the Court Security Officer to deliver the easel from the courtroom and the accompanying markers to the jury.

Does that response -- let me ask on the record for a response from the parties as Court's intended response to Jury Note No. 1. Does Plaintiff have -- have any objection to this response, both in written form and together with what will accompany it -- accompany it going to the jury?

MR. SON: Plaintiff does not object.

THE COURT: Does Defendant have any objection?

```
MR. HEIDRICK: No, Your Honor.
 1
 2
            THE COURT: All right. Then I'll hand the note --
   the actual note from the jury, which I've marked No. 1, to
 3
   the courtroom deputy. I'll hand the written response to
 4
   the jury with PTX-43 and PTX-288 to the Court Security
   Officer. I'll direct him to deliver that to the jury. And
 6
 7
   I'll direct him to deliver the easel and markers in the
 8
   courtroom to the jury.
            With that, counsel, awaiting either another note
   from the jury or a verdict, we stand in recess.
10
11
            COURT SECURITY OFFICER: All rise.
12
            (Recess.)
13
            (Jury out.)
            COURT SECURITY OFFICER: All rise.
14
15
            THE COURT: Be seated, please.
            Counsel, we've got a second note from the jury.
16
17
            As a matter of fact, we've got some artwork from
18
   the jury.
19
            I will read you what's on the note. I'll hand it
20
   then to the courtroom deputy, and I'll grant leave to
21
   Mr. Son and Mr. Heidrick to approach and look at it.
22
            I'm going to mark it in the upper right-hand
23
   corner with a 2 for identification purposes.
24
            This note says: Please send the diagram showing
   Jack Henry check processing flowchart. Thank you, Mary
25
```

Troboy. 1 2 I'll hand this to Ms. Lockhart. Counsel, if you want to come look at it, it looks 3 like to me it relates to a demonstrative that was probably 4 used during the trial. 5 MR. HEIDRICK: Demonstrative. 6 7 MR. SON: Demonstrative. THE COURT: So while you're here, let me hand you 8 a proposed response that I'm going to send to the jury. 10 This response would say: Members of the jury, in 11 response to your Jury Note No. 2, this drawing which you 12 requested was a demonstrative used with one or more witnesses during the trial. As I explained in my final 13 jury instructions to you, demonstratives are not evidence, 14 but the testimony given by a witness who uses a 15 16 demonstrative is evidence. Accordingly, you should -- you 17 will have to rely on your memory of any testimony given by 18 any witnesses while using or addressing this particular 19 demonstrative. 20 Any objection from either Plaintiff or Defendant about me sending that response back to the jury? 21 MR. SON: No objection from the Plaintiff. 22 23 MR. HEIDRICK: No objection, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: All right. I'm signing an original 25 copy of that response. I'll hand it to the Court Security

```
Officer and direct that he deliver it to the jury.
1
 2
            I will also hand a duplicate original signed, to
   the courtroom deputy for inclusion in the papers of this
 3
 4
   cause.
            Pending another note or the return of a verdict,
   we stand in recess.
 6
 7
            COURT SECURITY OFFICER: All rise.
            (Recess.)
 8
 9
            (Jury out.)
            COURT SECURITY OFFICER: All rise.
10
11
            THE COURT: Be seated, please.
12
            All right. Counsel, I've received the following
13
   note from the jury:
14
            We have a unanimous verdict.
15
            It's signed Mary Troboy, who is apparently the
   foreperson of the jury.
16
17
            I'll hand the original note to the courtroom
18
   deputy, and I'll direct the Court Security Officer to bring
19
   in the jury.
            COURT SECURITY OFFICER: All rise.
20
21
            (Jury in.)
22
            THE COURT: Members of the jury, please be seated.
23
            Ms. Troboy, I understand that you're the
24
   foreperson of the jury; is that correct?
25
            THE FOREPERSON: Yes, sir.
```

THE COURT: Has the jury reached a verdict? 1 2 THE FOREPERSON: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Would you please hand the completed 3 4 and signed verdict form to the Court Security Officer who will bring it to me? 5 Members of the jury, ladies and gentlemen, I'm 6 7 going to announce the verdict at this time into the record. 8 I'd like each member of the jury to listen very carefully, because after I've announced the verdict publicly, I'm going to ask each of you if this is your verdict so that we 10 11 can confirm on the record that it is, in fact, the 12 unanimous verdict of all eight members of the jury. 13 Turning to the verdict form, wherein on Page 3 is located Ouestion 1. 14 15 Did PPS Data prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Jack Henry directly infringed any of the 16 17 asserted claims of the '106 patent? 18 The answer of the jury is: Turning to Question 2 in the verdict form. 19 20 Did Jack Henry prove by clear and convincing 21 evidence that from the perspective of a person of ordinary 22 skill in the art, the asserted claims of the '106 patent 23 only include activities that were well-understood, routine, 24 and conventional as of April the 28th, 2000? 25 Thereunder all seven asserted claims are listed,

the jury's answer is the same for all seven asserted claims, and the jury's answer for each claim is: Yes.

Question 3, pursuant to the Court's instructions in the verdict form, is not answered and is left blank.

The last page of the verdict form is dated with today's date, September the 12th, 2019, and is signed by Mary Troboy as foreperson of the jury.

Members of the jury, let me poll you and make sure on the record that this is the unanimous verdict of all eight members of the jury.

If this is your verdict, as I have read it, would you please stand?

(Jury polled.)

THE COURT: Please be seated.

Let the record reflect that all eight members of the jury immediately rose and stood in response to the Court's question to poll the jury, and the Court finds that this is the unanimous verdict of all eight members of the jury.

The Court accepts the verdict, and I'll deliver the original verdict form to the courtroom deputy at this time.

Members of the jury, this now completes the trial in this case. From the very beginning, I've instructed you repeatedly about not discussing the case with anyone and

1 not discussing it among yourselves until you retired to deliberate.

I'm releasing you from those obligations now, and I'm releasing you from all the obligations you have as jurors in this case. I'm discharging you from that position.

Now, I know that the lawyers in the case would be interested in hearing from you if you're interested in talking to them. Here's how that works in this court, and it's been this way here for -- ever since I started practicing law in East Texas, and that's been over 35 years ago.

If you want to discuss your service in the case with anyone, including any of the members of either trial team, you're certainly free to do that. But you will have to initiate the discussion. They cannot come up to you and initiate a discussion with you about your service as jurors.

But if you'd like to talk with them, I'm confident, even though it's hot, they will probably be standing outside on the front sidewalk when you leave the courthouse, so you'll have the opportunity to walk by them. And if you are interested, stop and talk with them.

They will not initiate a conversation with you.

And if you're not interested in talking to them, then you

simply walk right by, don't stop, don't start a conversation. It's your decision, and your decision only.

Also, members of the jury, I'm going to ask -- I'm going to ask Mr. Son and Mr. Heidrick to give me a cell phone number, and I will give you those cell phone numbers in the jury room in a minute. And if either of you want to call either of them and talk about your service in the case, tomorrow, next week, next month, whenever it's convenient for you, you'll have their number, and you can call them. They will not have your numbers. They will not call you.

The -- the bottom line is you have to initiate a discussion. You can talk to anybody you want to about your service in this case. You don't have to talk to anybody about your service in this case. It's your decision and your decision only.

Also, ladies, I want you to understand how much the Court appreciates your service in this case. Even though this is Thursday and we didn't have to go through Friday, it's been a significant burden on each of you and a sacrifice to serve as jurors in this case, and that sacrifice is not lost on any of us.

And we are all aware as members of the third branch of government, the judiciary, that we would be unable to discharge our constitutional mandate without

1 citizens like you being willing to make the sacrifice 2 you've made in this case.

Some of you have driven, from where I can see, that you live 30, 40 miles, maybe more, each way each day. You've been here promptly. You've done everything the Court's asked you to do, and I cannot thank you enough for your service in this case.

As a matter of fact, I have a favor to ask of you, and I do this in every case. But my favor is I'd like you to take a few minutes and meet me in the jury room and let me come into the jury room. I'd like to shake each one of your hands. I'd like to look you in your eye and tell you personally how much I appreciate your service in this case.

I promise I won't keep you. I promise it will be short. But if you would afford me that privilege, I would consider it a privilege and an honor to thank you personally for your service.

You're not obligated to do that, but I promise if you will allow me that honor, it will be very short.

Members of the jury, that completes the trial of this case. You are discharged from your responsibility as jurors.

The Court accepts the jury's verdict, and the Court stands in recess.

I'll meet you in the jury room.

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COURT SECURITY OFFICER: All rise.
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 2
            (Jury out.)
 3
            THE COURT: As I said, counsel, that completes the
   trial of this case. You are excused.
 4
 5
             (Court adjourned.)
 6
 7
                         CERTIFICATION
 8
 9
10
            I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and
11
   correct transcript from the stenographic notes of the
12
   proceedings in the above-entitled matter to the best of my
13
   ability.
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16
    /S/ Shelly Holmes
                                             9/12/19
   SHELLY HOLMES, CSR, TCRR
                                             Date
   OFFICIAL REPORTER
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   State of Texas No.: 7804
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   Expiration Date: 12/31/20
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